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I. Introduction
Hedge funds have avoided direct regulation under federal
securities laws for most of their existence.1 The hedge fund
industry has gained a reputation for being secretive and opaque
mainly because information available on hedge funds is scarce.2
Since the collapse of a massive hedge fund in the late 1990s,
however, hedge funds have been targeted for increased
regulation.3 Over the decades, the federal government has
provided a variety of policy reasons in favor of regulating hedge
funds. The ebb and flow of hedge fund scrutiny, and the policy

1. See infra Part II.A (discussing how hedge funds have historically
avoided traditional federal securities laws).
2. See Barbara C. George, Lynne V. Dymally & Maria K. Boss, The
Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry: Victim or Culprit in the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 366 (2009) (referring to
the hedge fund industry as “under-regulated and opaque”); see also J.W. Verret,
Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation, Part II, A
Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 814 (2007) (explaining that
the hedge fund industry is highly secretive).
3. See infra Part II.B (discussing the implications that the collapse of the
massive hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) had on hedge
fund regulation).
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rationales behind hedge fund regulation, have predictably
correlated with major financial events.4
In 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge funds that had largely
invested in mortgage-backed investments5 collapsed.6 This
signaled a deteriorating U.S. mortgage market that would
eventually lead to the financial meltdown known as the subprime
mortgage crisis of 2008 (Financial Crisis).7 Soon after, the
Financial Crisis caused the United States to fall into a deep
recession.8 Hedge funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis, like
the hedge fund industry itself, is not fully understood.9
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis finally tipped the scales back
toward hedge fund regulation.
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act)10 to
provide stability to the damaged U.S. financial system.11
Although several areas of the Dodd–Frank Act affect hedge
funds, this Note focuses on Title IV of the Act, entitled the
4. See SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION § 3:1 (2011) (noting
that “the laws and rules to which hedge funds and their managers must adhere
are found in a variety of statutes and regulations, reflective, to a large extent, of
the gradual emergence of the hedge fund”).
5. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text (explaining the basics of
mortgage-backed investments and their involvement in the financial crisis of
2008).
6. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 4 (2012) (noting that in “July 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge
funds that had invested heavily in CDOs failed”).
7. See Matthew Beville, Dino Falaschetti & Michael J. Orlando, An
Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
849, 891 (2010) (“Though it was unclear at the time, the collapse of Bear
Stearns’s funds was the first sign that the mortgage market was collapsing and
that a large number of financial firms were overexposed to asset-backed
securities and related derivatives.”).
8. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that the “economy sank into
the deepest recession in decades” because of the Financial Crisis).
9. See George et al., supra note 2, at 359–60 (noting that some argue that
“hedge funds were among the contributors to the fiscal crisis” of 2008, while
others argue “that the hedge fund industry did not play a direct precipitating
role in the events leading to the financial meltdown”).
10. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (establishing financial
regulatory reform to provide stability to the U.S. financial system after the
Financial Crisis).
11. Id.
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Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010
(PFIARA).12 The PFIARA directly regulates the hedge fund
industry by requiring certain hedge fund advisers to register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).13 This Note evaluates
whether hedge fund adviser registration is necessary in light of
the Financial Crisis and the goals of the PFIARA (and the Dodd–
Frank Act generally), and if so, what form that regulation should
take.
Part II provides an introduction to hedge funds by focusing
on their history, general structures, and legal frameworks. Part
III discusses regulatory aspects of hedge funds prior to the
Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act.
Specifically, Part III focuses on how hedge funds avoided
regulation over the years and looks to specific events that spurred
interest in hedge fund regulation. Part IV explains the basics of
the Financial Crisis and hedge funds’ involvement in it. Part IV
then details the implications of the PFIARA’s enactment. Part V
analyzes whether hedge fund adviser registration under the
Advisers Act is necessary in light of the PFIARA’s goals. Next,
Part V provides recommendations for hedge fund regulation going
forward. Finally, Part VI offers conclusions.
Ultimately, this Note proposes that hedge fund adviser
registration under the Advisers Act is unnecessary to advance the
PFIARA’s goals because (i) there is already an adequate hedge
fund anti-fraud rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased
transparency to investors over the years; and (iii) hedge funds
have a sophisticated investor class that does not need the same
protections provided to ordinary investors. Because hedge fund
adviser registration is unnecessary to the PFIARA’s goals, it is a
waste of the hedge fund industry’s and the SEC’s resources.
The collection of systemic-risk-related14 data from hedge
funds, however, is necessary in light of the Financial Crisis, but
12. See id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b20 note) (“This title may be cited as the ‘Private Fund Investment Advisers
Registration Act of 2010’.”).
13. See id. §§ 403–404, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending adviser registration and reporting
requirements under the Advisers Act).
14. See infra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (explaining the concept
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adviser registration is not needed to achieve this task. This Note
asserts that once a threshold (based on hedge fund size) is
determined for an aggregate group of hedge funds most pertinent
to systemic risk assessment, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) should collect data directly through Form PF.
Collecting data from smaller hedge funds that do not meet the
determined threshold will produce an over-inclusive regime. At
the same time, this Note argues that once a proper threshold is
established, no hedge funds with assets under management
(AUM) exceeding the determined threshold should be exempt
from providing information related to systemic risk. Because size
is critical to assessing systemic risk concerns, exempting any
hedge funds with AUM exceeding the determined threshold
would produce an under-inclusive element to the regime as well.
This Note explores detailed recommendations to alleviate these
issues.
II. Hedge Funds in General
Part II of this Note addresses historical and legal aspects
regarding hedge funds before the Dodd–Frank Act. Part II.A
gives a history of hedge funds, while also discussing the general
structures and investment strategies of more popular hedge
funds. Part II.B examines hedge funds’ general legal frameworks.
A. Defining Hedge Fund
Hedge funds are hard to define because of their diverse,
complex, and secretive trading strategies.15 Typically, “hedge
funds” refer to private funds that pool the assets of wealthy and
institutional investors “to invest and trade in equity securities,
fixed-income securities, derivatives, futures and other financial
of systemic risk).
15. See DOUGLAS HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF
HEDGE FUNDS 1–2 (2005) (providing multiple examples of various hedge fund
investment strategies and noting that “investment philosophies of hedge funds
are as diverse as their portfolio managers”); see also Verret, supra note 2, at 814
(explaining that the hedge fund industry is highly secretive because hedge funds
want to protect their unique trading strategies).
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instruments.”16 Most hedge funds are professionally managed and
carry high levels of debt to increase certain investment positions
with the intention of amplifying gains.17 Hedge funds are
sometimes referred to as alternative investments because usually
they are not publicly traded, not very liquid, and difficult to
value.18 Also, despite the fact that hedge funds vary broadly in
investment strategy, they all strive to achieve absolute return,
which means that their “strategies are designed to generate
positive return regardless of overall market performance.”19
Most agree that Alfred Winslow Jones, a Columbia
University sociologist, pioneered the modern day hedge fund in
1949.20 Jones created a fund that would “hedge” against market
risks by offsetting declining values of long-stock positions with
appreciating values of short-stock positions and vice versa.21 Also,
Jones borrowed money for a portion of the fund’s investments to
increase leverage (debt-to-equity) in the hopes of magnifying
returns.22 Because Jones’s fund outperformed the leading mutual
16. HAMMER, supra note 15, at 1.
17. See Verret, supra note 2, at 803 (“High leverage, management
expertise, performance fees, and absolute return strategies are the hallmarks of
the industry.”).
18. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:3 (noting that alternative investments
differ from traditional investments because they are “generally not traded on a
public market and therefore tend to be less liquid and more difficult to value”).
19. Id.
20. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 189–90 (1999) (explaining
that Alfred Winslow Jones started the first hedge fund in 1949).
21. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1 (discussing that “Jones reasoned
that complementing a long portfolio with short positions would provide a ‘hedge’
against the influence of market movements on his portfolio as market-generated
declines in the value of the long portfolio would be offset by similarly generated
gains in the short portfolio”). This is because a long position appreciates when
the value of the held security rises, while a short position appreciates when the
underlying security’s value decreases. Id. Note that a long position generally
refers to a speculative position in an asset that is purchased and held with the
hopes that the asset’s value will rise over time. Id. Jones typically obtained his
short positions by short selling stocks; this is where Jones would sell a stock
that he did not own (borrowed the sold stock) and then would replace the sold
stock once the price fell to make a profit. Id. In sum, Jones was taking long
positions in stocks that he thought were undervalued and short positions in
stocks that he thought were overvalued to reduce “the prospect of losses by
taking a counterbalancing transaction.” Edwards, supra note 20, at 190.
22. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1 (detailing how borrowing, or
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funds of that era, the hedge fund concept became increasingly
popular.23
In 1970, an estimated 150 funds were managing over $1
billion in assets.24 By 2007, many factors—including the creation
of new financial markets and instruments, an influx of capital,
and an increase in the number of hedge funds—led to an
estimated $1.93 trillion in total AUM for hedge funds.25
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis negatively impacted the hedge
fund industry both in performance26 and reputation.27 Although
the hedge fund industry has slowly recovered, total AUM “remain
below their peak level in 2007.”28 Still, hedge funds play a key
role in the U.S. economy, and it is estimated that there are
almost “ten thousand hedge funds currently operating and
managing $1.5 trillion in assets.”29
Hedge funds’ general structures are diverse, but the majority
of funds share some common characteristics. Most hedge funds
require a significant initial minimum investment from their
investors30 and restrict their investors from withdrawing capital
leverage, “can magnify returns” by increasing the amount in a certain position,
but it can also magnify losses if the leveraged position moves contrarily of where
the investor intended).
23. See id. (explaining that as Jones’s fund outperformed the leading
mutual funds of his day, the hedge fund concept “generated interest with the
investment community”).
24. Id.
25. See id. (discussing how new financial markets and instruments in the
1980s, combined with an increase in capital in the 1990s, spurred hedge fund
growth).
26. See id. (examining how the Financial Crisis, among other reasons, led
to “negative performance as well as record withdrawals by investors which
combined to result in a decline in total assets managed in the hedge fund
industry . . . at the end of 2008”).
27. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 391 (2011) (discussing that in the aftermath of the Financial
Crisis, “[h]edge funds have been blamed for their part in the crisis and have
become a scapegoat for the problems affecting many aspects of the financial
markets”).
28. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1.
29. Scott V. Wagner, Comment, Hedge Funds: The Final Frontier of
Securities Regulation and a Last Hope for Economic Revival, 6 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 1, 3 (2009).
30. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that hedge funds usually
have high minimum-investment requirements and giving an example of a large
hedge fund in the late 1990s that required a $5 million minimum investment).
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during a fixed “lock-up” period.31 The lock-up period is designed
to encourage long-term investment, while ensuring the fund’s
liquidity by limiting withdrawals.32 Typically, hedge funds
compensate their managers in ways that highly reward gains.33
Hedge fund managers usually require a 1–2% fee for all AUM to
cover operating costs, while also requiring a 15–25% performance
fee of all profits made in a given year.34 From a managerial
standpoint, this is a very attractive feature because mutual funds
and other institutional funds usually pay flat fees.35 To combat
excessive risk-taking, and to further align the interests of
management and clients, most hedge funds force managers to
invest a certain amount of personal capital into the fund as
well.36 There is no doubt, however, that the possibility of
enormous profits has attracted great talent to the hedge fund
industry and has driven the development of creative investment
strategies typical of hedge funds.37

31. See id. (explaining that most hedge funds limit the ability of their
investors to withdraw funds so that the managers can invest in more illiquid
instruments over longer periods of time). The term “lock-up” refers to the
minimum holding period that the investors will have to wait until they can
withdraw funds. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3.3.
32. See id.
33. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 3 (“Hedge fund managers structure their
funds to create internal incentives that maximize returns.”).
34. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that hedge fund
administrative fees usually range from 1–1.5% of assets under management,
while large incentive fees range from 15–20%). Many funds also impose a
“hurdle rate,” which requires fund managers to exceed a minimum rate of
return before the manager’s performance fee will actually kick in. LEDERMAN,
supra note 4, § 2:3.3. Furthermore, some hedge funds subject their managers to
“high water marks,” which require fund managers to cover prior years’ losses
before earning a performance fee. Id.
35. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that mutual funds and
other institutional investors are usually prohibited from using incentive
performance fees, so they often have to employ a flat fee rate).
36. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:2.4 (pointing out that a major
distinction between hedge funds and mutual funds is the fact that most “[h]edge
fund managers usually invest a significant portion of their own liquid net worth
in their hedge funds alongside of the fund’s other investors”).
37. See Verret, supra note 2, at 828–29 (stating that mutual funds have
had a hard time competing with hedge funds for professional talent because of
hedge fund fee structures).
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As noted, hedge funds are extremely diverse because of their
flexible nature.38 Exploring the basics of three of the more
popular hedge fund strategies, however, will shed light on this
alternative investment. One type of hedge fund uses a hedgeequity strategy similar to Alfred Jones’s long- and short-position
model, but in the modern world, its focus is more specified—such
as a country-specific equity market focus or an industry equity
market focus.39 Another type of hedge fund, called a globalopportunistic hedge fund, looks to exploit macroeconomic factors
in different countries or regions.40 These hedge funds are more
event-driven—fund managers may look at political or currency
trends—and use their managers’ discretion or advanced computer
systems to find developing trends.41 A third type of hedge fund,
known as an arbitrage (or relative-value) hedge fund, looks to
“exploit pricing inefficiencies between or among related
instruments.”42 This very small sample of hedge fund strategies
shows just how diverse and flexible the hedge fund industry is as
a whole.

38. See Sue A. Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register
with the SEC, but More Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended,
67 LA. L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2006) (“While many trade in securities, bonds, and
currencies, some also trade in derivatives and other assets, such as movies and
even the rights to soccer players.”).
39. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:2.1 (noting the hedged equity strategy
is similar to the Jones model, but has evolved over time to focus more on areas
like country-specific and industry-specific equity markets). It is estimated that
30% of hedge funds use a strategy similar to the hedge equity strategy. Id.
40. See id. § 1:2.2 (explaining that the global-opportunistic strategy looks
at macroeconomic data to speculate on factors such as political or currency
trends).
41. See id. (“Global macro managers have historically been known for
making high risk, significantly leveraged investments that are often directional
in nature rather than being hedged.”); see also Verret, supra note 2, at 803
(“They may trade commodities or currency swaps based on macroeconomic data,
or trade on expected results of a merger or acquisition between two
companies.”).
42. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:2.3.
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B. Legal Framework

The vast majority of domestic hedge funds are set up as
limited partnerships or limited liability companies.43 These
structures allow them flexibility in terms of the relationship
between their managers and their investors.44 These are the most
popular legal structures for hedge funds because they offer
flexibility in governance (and management), limited liability, and
certain tax advantages.45 Most hedge funds form in Delaware,
“where they are subject to Delaware fiduciary duties.”46 Delaware
provides hedge funds with legal predictability because it has welldeveloped case law for both limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.47
Most of the legal implications facing hedge funds before the
Dodd–Frank Act hinged on the fact that sophisticated, wealthy
investors have traditionally made up the majority of hedge fund
investors.48 Historically, the government has viewed this affluent
class of investors as having the capabilities necessary to assess
the risks associated with hedge funds.49 For this reason, before
the Dodd–Frank Act hedge funds were largely unregulated.50
43. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 190 (“Although a hedge fund can be
organized as a limited liability company, most are organized as limited
partnerships . . . .”).
44. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3.3 (discussing that organizing a hedge
fund as a limited partnership or limited liability company provides flexibility
between the managers and investors because “[s]ubject to the manager’s
fiduciary and disclosure obligations, these terms can be tailored and adjusted for
different groups of investors within the fund”).
45. See id. § 2:3 (determining that limited partnerships and limited
liability gives hedge funds “flexibility and enables the fund to meet both
objectives of limited liability and tax efficiency”). The tax ramifications of hedge
funds are beyond the scope of this Note.
46. See Verret, supra note 2, at 804–05.
47. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3 (explaining that Delaware is the
most popular jurisdiction for hedge fund formation because of its well-developed
case law for limited partnerships and limited liability companies).
48. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 190 (“The clear intent of the legal
framework surrounding hedge funds is to limit them to wealthy and
sophisticated investors who are capable of assessing the risks associated with
hedge fund investments.”).
49. Id.
50. See id. (stating that because the government has viewed the affluent
class of typical hedge fund investors as capable of assessing the risks of hedge
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Some argue that minimal regulation in the hedge fund
industry has provided a true alternative investment for investors
because fund managers can creatively adapt to changing financial
markets without the fear of competitors immediately copying
their investment strategies.51 This freedom encourages the
development of diverse financial products because hedge funds
can produce unique investment strategies that may have little (or
no) correlation with traditional financial benchmarks.52
Furthermore, hedge funds encourage broad and efficient markets
by increasing trade in both established and less-established
markets.53 Price discovery of nontraditional assets is possible
because larger markets (or markets in general) are created for
nontraditional assets that normally would be extremely difficult
to value.54 Thus, liquidity becomes possible for traditionally
illiquid assets.55 Opponents of hedge fund regulation argue that
“[t]he lack of regulation has been paramount to the hedge fund’s
success.”56
III. (Attempted) Regulation Before the Dodd–Frank Act
Predictably, hedge fund regulation correlates with the
growth and popularity of the hedge fund industry—the interest in
regulating the hedge fund industry has grown with the
development of the industry itself.57 Because hedge funds have
funds, hedge funds have gone mostly unregulated).
51. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that the limited regulation of
hedge funds has allowed them to “adapt better to dynamic markets by
encouraging research and development of new and creative financial models”).
52. See Verret, supra note 2, at 804 (pointing out that hedge funds typically
have higher than average returns that “do not correlate with returns from the
long Standard and Poor’s 500 . . . or other traditional benchmarks”).
53. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 6–7 (discussing that hedge funds provide
large amounts of capital and help increase efficiency in both traditional and
nontraditional markets).
54. See id. at 6 (“Funds provide a means for a large amount of cash to enter
nontraditional investments and help force assets to their true valuations.”).
55. See id. at 7 (explaining that markets become “more efficient as assets
move closer to true valuation”). Furthermore, “with more capital in the market,
investors can more easily trade through the increased liquidity.” Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that laws and rules
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evolved over a number of decades, hedge fund regulation is
scattered throughout various statutes and regulations.58 Part
III.A analyzes how hedge funds have historically avoided
traditional securities regulation. Next, Part III.B discusses past
events that spurred interest in hedge fund regulation. Then, Part
III.C explores past attempts to directly regulate hedge funds
prior to the Dodd–Frank Act.
A. Traditional Securities Regulation: Historical Exemptions for
Hedge Funds
Four pieces of legislation—the Securities Act of 1933,59 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,60 the Investment Company Act
of 1940,61 and the Investment Advisers Act of 194062—make up
the core federal securities laws applicable to hedge fund
regulation.63 Nevertheless, prior to the Dodd–Frank Act, hedge
funds generally were able to avoid regulation under these laws
through various exemptions.64

affecting hedge funds have correlated with the evolution of the hedge fund).
58. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:1 (“As a result of the evolutionary
development of the hedge fund, the regulation of these financial vehicles cannot
be found in one concise codification.”).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010) (requiring that any offer or sale of
securities be registered with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act, unless an
exemption from registration exists under the law).
60. See id. §§ 78a–78mm (creating various regulations on U.S. financial
markets and establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the
federal agency primarily responsible for enforcement of U.S. federal securities
law).
61. See id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (directing the SEC to regulate investment
companies and securities exchanges).
62. See id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (establishing federal laws to regulate and
monitor investment advisers based on shareholder complaints of fraud).
63. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L.
REV. 681, 682 (2000) (explaining that without certain exclusions and
exemptions, “hedge funds would be subject to regulation under the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act
of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940”).
64. See Mota, supra note 38, at 58 (noting that hedge funds “often escape
regulation because they fall within the exemption provisions” of the traditional
U.S. federal securities laws).
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The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) regulates primary
market transactions in which a business entity (issuer) offers and
sells its securities publicly to raise money.65 Importantly, the
Securities Act requires issuers offering public securities to file a
registration statement with the SEC.66 The registration
statement serves as a disclosure mechanism that allows potential
investors to gather information regarding “the issuer’s business,
properties, material legal proceedings, directors and officers,
ownership, and financials.”67 To raise money, hedge funds offer
interests in their funds that usually fall within the Securities
Act’s definition of “security.”68
Recall that hedge funds typically form as hybrid entities,
such as limited partnerships or limited liability companies.69 The
Securities Act’s definition of security does not specifically
mention any hybrid entity interests.70 Nevertheless, hedge fund
interests offered to investors usually qualify as securities because
they are interpreted as “investment contracts.”71 An investment
contract, as defined by the Supreme Court, involves “investment
in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial

65. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
ANALYSIS 38 (3d. ed. 2012) (explaining that the Securities Act “focuses on
primary market transactions” and “requires issuers making a public offering to
file mandatory disclosure documents containing information deemed important
to investors”).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2010) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to
sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise
any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such
security . . . .”).
67. See id. § 77g (detailing specific information required in the registration
statement).
68. See id. § 77b(a)(1) (defining the term security under the Securities Act
as any “note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture . . .
investment contract,” and many other financial instruments).
69. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (noting that the vast
majority of domestic hedge funds are set up as hybrid entities, such as limited
partnerships or limited liability companies).
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (providing the definition of
security under the Securities Act).
71. See HAMMER, supra note 15, at 111 (explaining that most hedge fund
interests offered to investors are interpreted as investment contracts, which is
the “catch-all” category of the Securities Act’s security definition).
AND
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efforts of others.”72 Hedge funds offer their limited partnership
and limited liability company interests to passive investors who
receive nominal (or no) management authority—and because
these investors expect profits from management (efforts of
others), most hedge fund offerings qualify as investment
contracts.
Still, the majority of hedge funds avoid registration under the
Securities Act because they use the private securities offerings
exemption (private offering exemption).73 Under § 4(2) of the
Securities Act, any “transactions by an issuer not involving a
public offering” are exempt from having to comply with the
Securities Act’s disclosure and registration requirements.74
Furthermore, in 1983, the SEC promulgated Regulation D75
under the Securities Act to clarify and provide more predictability
for when funds trying to use the private offering exemption are
exempt from registration.76 Rule 506 of Regulation D is most
applicable to hedge funds because it provides a safe harbor for the
private offering exemption in certain situations.77 For example,
Rule 506 exempts from registration hedge fund offerings that
meet certain conditions,78 including only offering interests to

72. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). Note
that the quoted investment contract test in Forman is derived from the original
investment contract test in SEC v. Howey. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
The original Howey investment contract test states, “The test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. at 301.
73. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59 (detailing how most hedge fund
securities offerings may avoid registration under the Securities Act using the
private offering exemption found in § 4(2) of the Securities Act).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2010) (establishing that the registration
requirements provided in the Act do not apply to “transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering”).
75. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2011) (establishing Regulation D to
provide issuers with more clarity in private placements).
76. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 550 (explaining that the SEC
promulgated Regulation D of the Securities Act to “provide issuers greater
certainty in private placements”).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (establishing a safe harbor for the § 4(2)
exemption in the Securities Act).
78. See id. § 230.506 (detailing conditions that must be met in order for an
offer or sale of securities to be exempt from registration requirements under
Regulation D of the Securities Act).
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purchasers that qualify as “accredited investors.”79 Most hedge
funds comply with these limits and avoid registering their
offerings under the Securities Act.80 In fact, the SEC has
proposed rules to implement the newly enacted Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act81 that make Rule 506 even friendlier to
hedge funds by eliminating the prohibition on general solicitation
in private placements so long as the only purchasers are
accredited investors.82
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) created
the SEC83 and contains provisions that are relevant to hedge
funds.84 Specifically, the Exchange Act regulates secondary
market transactions in which “one investor resells securities of
the issuer to another investor.”85 The Exchange Act requires
periodic reporting to the SEC for certain companies that qualify
under the statute (usually publicly-traded companies).86 Some of
79. See id. § 230.501(a) (providing the conditions that must be met in order
to qualify as an “accredited investor” under the Securities Act). Generally, an
individual with a net worth exceeding $1 million (excluding the individual’s
home residence after the Dodd–Frank Act) or an individual whose total yearly
income is more than $200 thousand will qualify as an accredited investor. Id.
Also, a company or university with assets exceeding $5 million, usually, will
qualify as an accredited investor. Id. These are the basic requirements for an
accredited investor; however, there are more focused situations covered under
Regulation D of the Securities Act. Also, Rule 506 of Regulation D allows an
issuer to satisfy exemption requirements if the issuer offers interests to no more
than thirty-five non-accredited purchasers. Id. § 230.506.
80. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 10 (“Hedge funds typically meet the
requirements of Regulation D by limiting fund investors to individuals with
high net worth or institutional investors that meet the minimum thresholds.”).
81. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (aiming to increase job creation and
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging
growth companies).
82. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9354 (Aug. 29, 2012).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2010) (establishing the SEC as a regime for
regulating secondary markets).
84. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60 (noting that some of the provisions of
the Exchange Act may apply to hedge funds).
85. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 1. Willa Gibson notes that the
Exchange Act “covers all facets of the securities markets and all transactions
involving securities, in contrast to the Securities Act which is directed primarily
at the offering and distribution of securities.” Gibson, supra note 63, at 691.
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (stating specific periodical and other
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the Exchange Act’s provisions could affect hedge funds issuing
equity.87 For example, a hedge fund would have to make
extensive disclosures, through periodic reporting, to the SEC if it
qualified as a public company under § 12(g)88 of the Exchange
Act.89 To trigger § 12(g) and its associated rules, a hedge fund
would have to issue equity interests to over 2000 persons—or 500
persons who are not accredited investors—and the fund’s assets
would need to exceed $10 million.90 Regardless, this threshold has
been easy for hedge funds to avoid.91 Thus, the Exchange Act has
not played a large part in the history of hedge fund regulation.
Another traditional U.S. securities law, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act), has the
potential to regulate hedge funds. Many financial funds, such as
mutual funds, register as investment companies under the
Investment Company Act.92 Registered investment companies are
limited in the types of transactions they can use.93 For example,
registered investment companies are restricted in their use of
short sales and must obtain shareholder approval for investing in
certain assets and borrowing substantial money.94 As discussed
above, “[t]hese transactions are core elements of most hedge
reporting requirements certain issuers of securities must file with the SEC).
87. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60 (discussing that the Exchange Act’s
periodic reporting requirements could be relevant to hedge funds).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (outlining when an issuer under the Exchange
Act must register and providing certain exemptions).
89. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2010) (outlining when an issuer under the
Exchange Act must register and providing certain exemptions).
91. See Mota, supra note 38, at 60 (“Most hedge funds . . . avoid registration
under the 1934 Act . . . .”).
92. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(noting
that mutual funds must register with the SEC under the Investment Company
Act).
93. See id. (“The Investment Company Act places significant restrictions on
the types of transactions registered investment companies may undertake.”).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3) (2010) (stating that it is unlawful for a
registered investment company “to effect a short sale of any security,” except in
certain situations, contrary to the rules and regulations promulgated by the
SEC under the Investment Company Act); see also id. § 80a-13(a)(2) (stating
that in most situations a registered investment company, without majority
shareholder approval, cannot “borrow money, issue senior securities, underwrite
securities issued by other persons, purchase or sell real estate or commodities or
make loans to other persons”).
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funds’ trading strategies.”95 The Investment Company Act
requires investment companies—defined as almost any issuer
which is “in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities”96—to register with the SEC and disclose investment
activities, investment policies, and other information.97 Although
hedge funds fall within the definition of an investment company,
the Investment Company Act has two exemptions available to
most hedge funds.98 First, any investment company that is not
owned by more than 100 investors and does not plan to make a
public offering of its securities is exempt.99 Hedge funds generally
do not make public offerings, so this exemption is favorable to
hedge funds with less than 100 investors.100 Second, the
Investment Company Act exempts investment companies
exclusively owned by “qualified purchasers.”101 This allows hedge
funds owned solely by “qualified purchasers” to circumvent

95. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875.
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (stating that an investment company under
the Investment Company Act is a broad term that means, but is not limited to,
“any issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes
to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities”).
97. See id. § 80a-8(b) (stating that an investment company must disclose
investment activities, investment policies, and other information when an
investment company is required to register with the SEC under the Investment
Company Act).
98. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that
the definition of an investment company in the Investment Company Act
“nominally describes hedge funds”).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (explaining that “[a]ny issuer whose
outstanding securities . . . are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred
persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a
public offering of its securities” is not recognized as an investment company
under the Investment Company Act).
100. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (explaining most hedge funds “are
exempt . . . because they have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners and do
not offer their securities to the public”).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2010) (noting an exemption for registration
under the Investment Company Act is allowed for “[a]ny issuer, the outstanding
securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of
acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers”). Generally, a “qualified
purchaser” is any person or family-owned company owning more than $5 million
in investments or any person who owns and invests on a discretionary basis $25
million or more. Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A).

668

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651 (2013)

registration under the Investment Company Act, even if the fund
has more than 100 investors.
The fourth traditional federal securities regulation relevant
to hedge funds is the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act). The Advisers Act requires all investment advisers, including
hedge fund advisers, to register with the SEC and disclose
information such as compensation, the adviser’s balance sheet,
the scope of the adviser’s authority, and other data.102 Prior to the
Dodd–Frank Act, however, an exemption excused advisers
managing less than fifteen clients from having to register with
the SEC under the Advisers Act (private-adviser exemption).103
To qualify for the private-adviser exemption, hedge fund advisers
historically argued that each hedge fund they managed only
counted as one client (rather than counting every investor in
every hedge fund managed by the adviser).104 So, hedge funds
could manage up to fourteen different hedge funds, regardless of
the number of investors in each fund, and still be exempt from
registration under the Advisers Act.105 Then, in 1984, to the
delight of hedge fund advisers, the SEC passed a safe harbor rule
that explicitly allowed private fund managers to count each fund
managed as one client.106
Nevertheless, Title IV of the Dodd–Frank Act (PFIARA) has
repealed and amended sections of the Advisers Act.107 Most
important to this Note (and as discussed below), the Dodd–Frank
Act eliminated the private-adviser exemption from the Advisers
Act.108 Although hedge funds have eluded traditional federal
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)–(c) (detailing disclosure and registration
requirements for investment advisers under the Advisers Act).
103. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 12 (stating that the exemption under the
Advisers Act allowed an exemption for advisers with fewer than 15 clients).
104. See id. (“Traditionally, hedge fund advisers avoided registration under
the Advisers Act by arguing that fund managers maintain only one client, the
hedge fund itself.”).
105. See Kaal, supra note 27, at 414 (“Even the largest hedge fund managers
usually ran fewer than fifteen hedge funds and were, therefore, exempt.”).
106. See Mota, supra note 38, at 62 (“In 1985, the SEC adopted a rule
allowing investment advisers to count each pooled investment vehicle as a
single client.”).
107. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
the Dodd–Frank Act’s amendments to the Advisers Act relating to the
regulation of hedge funds).
108. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (same).
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securities laws for decades, the Dodd–Frank Act’s amendments to
the Advisers Act are the most direct regulation of hedge funds to
date.
B. 1990s: Major Hedge Fund’s Collapse Spurs Regulation Debate
For decades, hedge funds avoided SEC registration and most
regulation under the traditional federal securities laws without
controversy. In the late 1990s, however, the collapse of the
massive hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
sparked debate regarding the need for hedge fund regulation.109
A group of highly reputable traders formed LTCM in 1994.110
The fund had starting equity of $1.3 billion ($100 million of which
was contributed by the general partners) and required outside
investors to invest at least $10 million.111 At LTCM’s peak, in
1997, the fund grew to larger than $7 billion after the fund made
returns of 19.9% in 1994, 42.8% in 1995, 40.8% in 1996, and
17.1% in 1997.112 LTCM typically used an investment strategy
that held “long positions in bonds that it considered undervalued
and short positions in bonds that it considered overvalued.”113
Based on the yield spread between its positions in high- and lowrisk bonds, LTCM would essentially bet on the spread to widen or
narrow using derivatives contracts.114
109. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 200 (noting that the collapse, near
bankruptcy, and bailout of LTCM in late 1990s sparked conversation about
whether there was a need for additional hedge fund regulation).
110. See id. at 199 (noting that the general partners included a former head
of bond trading at Salomon Brothers, a former vice chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, and two Nobel Prize recipients for work in the pricing of
financial instruments).
111. See id. at 197 (explaining that LTCM was formed in February 1994
with equity of $1.3 billion, of which $100 million came from its general partners,
and the fund “required a minimum investment of $10 million, and no
withdrawals for three years”).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 197–98.
114. See id. at 198 (explaining that LTCM would buy “high-yielding, less
liquid bonds, such as Danish mortgage-backed securities” and then sell short
“low-yielding, more liquid bonds, such as U.S. government bonds”). Then, if
LTCM thought “the yield spread between the high and low risk bonds . . . was
excessively wide,” the fund would bet on the spread to narrow using derivatives
contracts. Id.

670

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651 (2013)

In early 1998, LTCM became convinced, for a number of
reasons, the yield spread between its high- and low-risk bonds
was too wide; thus, LTCM bet on the yield spread to narrow.115
LTCM borrowed $125 billion from banks (on top of the fund’s
then $4.8 billion AUM) and increased its leverage ratio (debt-toequity ratio) to more than 20-to-1.116 This leverage ratio, which is
extraordinarily large for any hedge fund, would magnify gains or
losses depending on the widening or narrowing of LTCM’s yield
spread.117 Later that year, a number of circumstances instilled
fear in global bond investors and there was a “stampede to
quality” bonds.118 Thus, LTCM’s yield spread widened (instead of
narrowed) and the fund’s failed bet was exposed.119
In September 1998, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
became worried about LTCM’s creditors (including banks and
securities firms) that would suffer losses as a result of LTCM’s
collapse.120 A creditor consortium, including the government,
decided that the collapse of LTCM posed “systemic risk” (due to
the number of overexposed parties and the amount of money
involved) and agreed to a bailout of over $3.6 billion.121 Systemic
risk is defined as the risk that “an economic shock such as a
115. See id. at 198 (“LTCM believed that in late 1997 and early 1998, partly
as a consequence of the collapse of Asian countries in the summer of 1997, the
yield spread between high and low risk bonds . . . was excessively wide.”).
116. Id.
117. See id. (describing LTCM’s leverage ratio in 1998 as “high by any
standard”). Because the leverage ratio was so high, “[e]ven a small reduction in
yield spreads would mean huge profits for LTCM.” Id. On the reserve side,
losses would be magnified as well. Id.
118. See id. at 199 (“As fear spread of what the market repercussions to . . .
market breakdowns might be . . . there was a stampede to ‘quality.’”). This
stampede to quality meant bond investors began to dump their more risky
bonds for safer (yet lower-yielding) bonds. Id. Among the leading reasons for
global fear in the bond market was the result of Russia devaluing its currency
and refusing to honor contracts sold to customers. Id.
119. See id. (“This sharp widening of yield spreads caused by a stampede to
liquidity and quality was just the opposite of what LTCM was betting on.”).
120. See id. at 200 (explaining that in September 1998, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York became aware of LTCM’s potential collapse and held
meetings to discuss the situation).
121. See id. (describing how a creditor consortium decided to bailout LTCM
to the tune of $3.6 billion after the group decided LTCM’s collapse posed
systemic risk based on the amount of money involved and the number of
overexposed lenders involved).
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market or institutional failure triggers (through panic or
otherwise) either the failure of a chain of markets or institutions
or a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, resulting
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability.”122 Systemic risk can be paralleled to a domino effect
in which a trigger event (here LTCM’s collapse) “causes a chain of
bad economic consequences” that have the potential to bring
down other financial institutions and overall markets.123 LTCM’s
collapse was the first event that clearly demonstrated hedge
funds could have systemic risk consequences. The magnitude of
LTCM’s exposure to other market participants showed that a
massive hedge fund’s failure could have devastating effects on the
overall market.124
As a result of LTCM’s collapse, the government issued two
reports detailing what went wrong with LTCM and how the
hedge fund industry could be better regulated.125 The first report
by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets,126
recommended that more information on hedge funds should be
disclosed publicly to prevent hedge funds from overleveraging
their investments.127 This report also urged lenders to establish
better standards for evaluating hedge funds when extending
credit.128 The second report, conducted by the United States
General Accounting Office (GAO), confirmed that LTCM’s
massive size and leverage created systemic risk that posed a
122. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
123. Id. at 198.
124. See id. at 203 (“In LTCM, the potential for systemic risk existed not by
reason of its intrinsic status as a hedge fund but by the sheer size of its exposure
to other institutions and market participants.”).
125. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (“In the wake of LTCM, two
significant governmental studies were issued in 1999.”).
126. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf .
127. See id. at 31 (“Improving transparency through enhanced disclosure to
the public should help market participants make better, more informed
judgments about market integrity and the creditworthiness of borrowers and
counterparties.”). This is because the report thought “[t]he central public policy
issue raised by the LTCM episode is how to constrain excessive leverage more
effectively.” Id.
128. See id. at 30 (explaining that there was a breakdown in market
discipline of lending practices during the LTCM situation).
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threat to the financial system.129 Nevertheless, these reports
focused on improving public information about hedge funds
through disclosure rather than calling for the exemptions for
hedge funds in traditional securities laws to be amended or
repealed.130
In response to these reports and the crash of LTCM,
Congress proposed two bills that suggested information-gathering
strategies to prevent another major hedge fund collapse, rather
than direct regulation.131 The first bill, the Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act (1999 Disclosure Bill),132 required “unregulated
hedge funds” to submit certain information to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve
Board).133 The bill defined an unregulated hedge fund as any
private fund with $3 billion or more in capital that was not
registered under the Investment Company Act; this also included
any family or group of pooled hedge funds with AUM of $20
billion or more.134 These unregulated hedge funds would have to
make public quarterly reports including the funds’ total assets,
derivatives positions, leverage ratios, and other measures of
market risk identified by the Federal Reserve Board (and other
government actors such as the SEC).135 Hedge funds could
request that some proprietary information, such as investment

129. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (“The second study, conducted by the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), also focused on LTCM’s
extensive leverage and its potential adverse impact on the financial system as a
whole.”).
130. See Mota, supra note 38, at 63 (explaining that of the reports and
recommendations that were issued in the aftermath of LTCM, none of them
recommended “changes to . . . the exemptions for hedge funds under” traditional
federal securities laws).
131. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (explaining that two bills came in
response to LTCM’s collapse and the ensuing government studies).
132. See H.R. 2924, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Disclosure Bill]
(proposing federal legislation that requires certain hedge funds to disclose
specified information to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
133. See id. § 4 (describing that unregulated hedge funds have to submit
quarterly reports to the Federal Reserve Board).
134. See id. § 3(3) (providing the definition for unregulated hedge fund
under the proposed legislation).
135. See id. § 4(a) (detailing the information that an unregulated hedge fund
would have to provide to the Federal Reserve Board on a quarterly basis).
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strategies, be kept confidential from the public.136 Congress
recognized that hedge funds had the potential to affect systemic
risk, but it did not think direct regulation was the best option.137
Still, the proposed legislation called for “reliable information
about hedge fund activities”138 to ensure that the government
could prevent (or, if necessary, control) the collapse of any major
hedge funds that could cause a “severe burden on the United
States financial system.”139
The second bill introduced was the Derivatives Market
Reform Act of 1999 (1999 Reform Bill).140 It aimed to reduce
systemic risk in the financial markets through “enhance[d]
oversight over certain derivatives dealers and hedge funds.”141
Titles I and II of the 1999 Reform Bill dealt largely with
derivatives markets.142 Title III, however, shared many of the
same reporting requirements for certain hedge funds as the
proposed 1999 Disclosure Bill.143 The 1999 Reform Bill required
quarterly reporting to the SEC for “unregistered hedge funds,”
defined as “any pooled investment vehicle, or group or family of
pooled investment vehicles, that has total AUM of $1 billion or
more,” and is not registered under the Investment Company
Act.144 Thus, the threshold for reporting was $2 billion lower than
136. See id. § 4(c) (explaining that a hedge fund may request that
“proprietary information concerning investment strategies and positions” in a
quarterly report “be segregated in a confidential section of the report which
shall not be available to the public”).
137. See id. § 2 (stating that the congressional findings noted that hedge
funds can potentially “pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the United
States and international financial systems,” but “market forces, rather than
government regulations, are the best tools for constraining hedge funds”).
138. Id. § 2(8).
139. Id. § 2(7).
140. See H.R. 3483, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Reform Bill]
(“[A]mend[ing] federal securities laws to enhance oversight over certain
derivatives dealers and hedge funds, reduce the potential for such entities to
increase systemic risk in the financial markets, enhance investor protections,
and other purposes.”).
141. Id.
142. See id. §§ 101, 201 (providing reform for federal securities laws dealing
with certain derivatives dealers and broker-dealer oversight).
143. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (noting the similarities in the
quarterly reporting requirements, for certain hedge funds, of the 1999 Reform
Bill compared to those of the 1999 Disclosure Bill).
144. H.R. 3483, 106th Cong. § 301(k)(5)(A) (1999).
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the 1999 Disclosure Bill, and it had no “family or group” of pooled
hedge funds distinction. The quarterly reports would include
detailed financial information and “[a] description of the models
and methodologies that the pooled investment vehicle use[d] to
calculate, assess, and evaluate market risk.”145 This information
would be made public by the SEC and shared amongst various
federal agencies.146 The 1999 Reform Bill also allowed hedge
funds to request that information, such as trading strategies, be
kept confidential.147
Ultimately, Congress did not enact either of the two bills.148
The collapse of LTCM was soon regarded as a one-off that was
unlikely to occur again.149 Many saw LTCM as an outlier to the
hedge fund industry and believed banks (and other lenders) had
tightened their lending practices enough to avoid another such
build-up of excessive leverage.150 The hedge fund industry vowed
to become more transparent to its investors, providing additional
comfort that increased hedge fund regulation was unnecessary.151
Although no direct regulation of hedge funds resulted from the
collapse of LTCM, the situation sparked more serious debate for
hedge fund regulation.152

145. Id. § 301(k)(1)(A)–(F).
146. See id. § 301(k)(3) (describing the availability of the quarterly reports
upon the SEC’s receipt under the 1999 Reform Bill).
147. See id. § 301(k)(4) (stating the procedures for the confidentiality of
proprietary information under the 1999 Reform Bill).
148. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (noting that neither the 1999
Disclosure Bill nor the 1999 Reform Bill were enacted).
149. See id. (“As the events of 1998 receded in time, there was a growing
appreciation that the facts surrounding LTCM were not representative of hedge
funds in general.”).
150. See id. (explaining that in 1998 the International Monetary Fund and
The President’s Working Group noted that banks, and other lenders, had
improved their management of hedge fund exposures through better credit
practices after the collapse of LTCM).
151. See id. (discussing how the “hedge fund industry itself responded with
initiatives to improve risk management and provide greater transparency to
investors”).
152. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 17 (suggesting that 2004 hedge fund
regulation proposals were, in part, a result of reports and meetings that
occurred after the collapse of LTCM).
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C. 2004: Push for Direct Hedge Fund Regulation
The debate regarding hedge fund regulation did not seriously
resurface until 2003 when the SEC called for a Hedge Fund
Roundtable.153 At that time, the technology bubble had burst and
investors were looking for alternative ways to invest their
money.154 As a result, the SEC noticed that hedge funds were
enjoying an influx of capital and the industry was growing.155
This led to the rise of so-called “funds of funds,” which invest in a
variety of different hedge funds to maintain exposure to the
hedge fund industry while diversifying portfolio allocations.156
The SEC became concerned that funds of funds could directly
expose less wealthy—and often less-sophisticated—individual
investors to hedge funds through public offerings.157 The SEC
acknowledged, however, most of these offerings were limited to
institutional investors (pension funds, public companies, etc.).158
Meanwhile, institutional investors also were investing more in
general hedge funds, so less-sophisticated individual investors,
who had invested in various institutional investors, were now
being indirectly exposed to hedge funds.159 And, in the
153. See Mota, supra note 38, at 63 (noting that the SEC held a Hedge Fund
Roundtable in 2003 to discuss the possibility of a hedge fund study).
154. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:4 (noting that when the bull market of
the 1990s came to an end, with the burst of the technology bubble, more
investors looked to alternative investments, such as hedge funds).
155. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter 2004 Hedge Fund Rule] (noting that in 2003 the
hedge fund industry assets had grown 30% in the previous year and 260% in the
previous five years).
156. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS 67 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (defining a fund of hedge funds as a “hedge fund
that utilizes a multi-manager, multi-strategy approach by investing all, or a
significant portion of its assets in hedge funds”).
157. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057 (noting “the
development of ‘funds of hedge funds’ ha[d] made hedge funds more broadly
available to investors” by 2003).
158. See id. (explaining that only institutional investors participated in the
offerings of most funds of hedge funds in 2003).
159. See id. at 72,058 (explaining that in the few years before 2003, “a
growing number of public and private pension funds, as well as universities,
endowments, foundations, and other charitable organizations, ha[d] begun to
invest in hedge funds or ha[d] increased their allocations to hedge funds”).
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background of all of this, the SEC had seen an increase in their
enforcement actions against fraudulent hedge fund advisers.160
By September 2003, the SEC issued a report called
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds (2003 Report)161 that
recommended direct regulation of hedge funds through the
Advisers Act based on various public policy concerns.162 The 2003
Report cited the growth of hedge funds, growth in hedge fund
fraud, and broader exposure to hedge funds as reasons for direct
regulation.163 The 2003 Report noted that prior SEC staff reports
had studied the systemic risks posed by hedge funds, but this
report chose to focus on “the growth and investor protection
implications of hedge funds.”164
Accordingly, in 2004, the SEC promulgated a rule under the
Advisers Act entitled the Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers (2004 Hedge Fund Rule).165 The
SEC cited the 2003 Report’s policy reasons for the administrative
action.166 The 2004 Hedge Fund Rule made changes to how an
adviser could qualify for registration exemption under the
Advisers Act.167 Recall that hedge fund advisers were
traditionally exempt from SEC registration under the Advisers
Act if they managed less than fifteen clients—and prior to the
160. See id. at 72,056 (stating that by 2003 the SEC had seen a “growth in
the number of [SEC] hedge fund fraud enforcement cases”).
161. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 156.
162. See id. at 88 (noting that the 2003 Report’s primary recommendation to
the SEC was to “consider mandating federal registration of hedge fund
investment advisers under the Advisers Act” based on a variety of concerns).
163. See id. at 76–88 (outlining the growth of hedge funds, the growth in
hedge fund fraud, and the broader exposure to hedge funds as reasons for
recommending regulation of hedge funds under the Advisers Act to the SEC).
164. Id. at 3.
165. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (stating that the SEC adopted the 2004
Hedge Fund Rule to require certain hedge funds to register with the SEC under
the Advisers Act).
166. See id. at 72,055–059 (citing growth of hedge funds, growth in hedge
fund fraud, and broader investor exposure to hedge funds as the primary
reasons for promulgating the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule).
167. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2004), invalidated by Goldstein v.
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring hedge funds to count
“shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries” as clients for
purposes of § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act).
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2004 Hedge Fund Rule, hedge fund advisers could count each
fund they managed as one client rather than counting every
individual investor in each managed fund.168 This enabled hedge
fund advisers to manage fourteen separate funds, each with
multiple investors, and still qualify for the private-adviser
exemption under the Advisers Act.169 The 2004 Hedge Fund Rule,
however, required hedge fund advisers to “look-through” each of
their managed funds and actually count every individual client in
each fund.170 Consequently, the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule required
most hedge funds to register with the SEC by February 1,
2006.171
The SEC passed the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule by a narrow 3–2
vote.172 The two dissenting SEC commissioners did not think
registration under the Advisers Act was the best alternative and
argued that the SEC should have “collected and analyzed the
existing information [on hedge funds] and determined what new
information would be useful before imposing mandatory
registration.”173 The dissent also suggested this was a misuse of
the SEC’s already limited resources.174 Not surprisingly, most
hedge fund advisers were unhappy about having to register with
the SEC, and it did not take long before a prominent hedge fund
168. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text (discussing historical
exemptions for hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act).
169. See Verret, supra note 2, at 806 (noting that before the 2004 Hedge
Fund Rule, “[e]ven the largest hedge fund managers usually ran fewer than
fifteen hedge funds and were, therefore, exempt”).
170. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,066 (requiring hedge
fund advisers “to ‘look-through’ the funds to count the number of investors as
‘clients’ for purposes of the private-adviser exemption” under the Advisers Act).
171. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The [2004
Hedge Fund Rule] had the effect of requiring most hedge fund advisers to
register by February 1, 2006.”).
172. See Kaal, supra note 27, at 415 (“The [2004 Hedge Fund Rule] was
eventually issued by a [3–2] vote . . . .”). This was not a party-line vote as
Chairman William H. Donaldson (Republican) joined Harvey J. Goldschmid
(Democrat) and Roel C. Campos (Democrat) in favor of the 2004 Hedge Fund
Rule. Cynthia A. Glassman (Republican) and Paul S. Atkins (Republican)
dissented.
173. 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,089 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
174. See id. at 72,090 (arguing that the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule would result
in a misuse of the SEC’s limited resources).
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manager challenged the regulation in court.175 In Goldstein v.
SEC,176 on June 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia invalidated the look-through provision of the 2004
Hedge Fund Rule.177 With the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule vacated,
hedge fund managers reverted back to counting each fund they
managed as one client to qualify for the private-adviser
exemption under the Advisers Act.
After Goldstein vacated the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC
did not pursue an appeal. The SEC, however, remained focused
on protecting hedge fund investors from fraudulent hedge fund
advisers.178 In 2007, instead of attempting another round of direct
regulation, the SEC proposed179 and adopted Rule 206(4)-8
(Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule) under § 206 of the Advisers Act.180
Specifically, the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule prevents hedge
fund advisers from “making false or misleading statements to
investors” or “otherwise defrauding” them.181 The SEC noted that
it “would not need to demonstrate that an adviser violating [the
Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] acted with scienter [(knowledge or
175. See Verret, supra note 2, at 809 (“In June of 2006, Philip Goldstein and
his hedge fund Opportunity Partners L.P. challenged the SEC's equation of
‘client’ with ‘investor’ in the new regulation.”).
176. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the 2004
Hedge Fund Rule, requiring that investors in a hedge fund be counted as clients
of the fund’s adviser for purposes of the private-adviser exemption from
registration under the Advisers Act, was invalid).
177. See id. (vacating the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule).
178. See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 9 (2006)
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (recommending that the SEC
promulgate an anti-fraud rule under the Investment Advisers Act after the
decision in Goldstein).
179. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed.
Reg. 400, 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 275)
(proposing an anti-fraud rule that would affect all hedge fund advisers).
180. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,756 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] (adopting an anti-fraud rule
that “prohibits advisers to [hedge funds] from making false or misleading
statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective investors in
those [hedge funds]”).
181. Id. For the full codification of the SEC’s Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule,
see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011).
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intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud)].”182 The SEC decided
that using a negligence standard for determining the liability of
fraudster hedge fund advisers is appropriate under the Hedge
Fund Anti-Fraud Rule.183 Furthermore, the Rule extends to all
hedge fund advisers, including those exempt from SEC
registration.184 The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, therefore, has
a lower standard than the “catch-all” anti-fraud securities rule
under the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, which requires scienter for
liability.185 Although the SEC did not ultimately prevail with
direct adviser registration through the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule,
the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule is a serious disincentive for
fraudulent activity by hedge fund advisers.
IV. Direct Hedge Fund Regulation under Title IV (PFIARA) of the
Dodd–Frank Act
Part IV.A looks at the basics of the Financial Crisis and the
role hedge funds played in it. Part IV.B details the implications of
the enactment of Title IV of the Dodd–Frank Act (PFIARA).
A. Two Failed Hedge Funds Kick-Off Financial Crisis
Although the causes of the Financial Crisis are myriad and
complex (and largely beyond the scope of this Note), the general
background of the crisis will help shed light on hedge fund
regulation under the Dodd–Frank Act. By 2006, there was a flood
of capital into the U.S. real estate market because of low interest
rates and investor optimism surrounding “seemingly ever-rising
housing prices.”186 Through securitization, which “involves
182. Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759.
183. See id. at 44,759 (“[The SEC] believe[s] use of a negligence standard
also is appropriate as a method reasonably designed to prevent fraud.”).
184. See id. at 44,758 (“[The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] applies to both
registered and unregistered investment advisers.”).
185. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Inc., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007)
(“To establish liability under § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and Rule 10b-5, a
private plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”) (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1976)).
186. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4.
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pooling income-generating assets and then selling interests in the
pool that derive their value from those underlying assets,”187 a
broad range of investors became exposed to mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs).188 In MBSs, mortgages (the underlying,
income-generating asset) are pooled together and then investors
can buy securities representing claims to the underlying income
stream.189
Banks used credit enhancements for MBSs, such as
guarantees covering defaulting mortgages in the pool, to
encourage investor confidence.190 Banks also hired credit-rating
agencies to rate the securities for marketing purposes.191 The
credit-rating agencies rated the MBSs using models that assumed
the U.S. housing market would continually rise and mortgage
default rates would remain low.192 This led to more investors
exposing themselves to what they thought was a low-risk, always
appreciating U.S. housing market. As demand for MBS-type
investments
increased,
“more
complex
pools-of-pools
(collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs)—and even pools-ofpools-of-pools (so called CDO squared)—emerged.”193 And, as
money rolled into the housing market, banks “started to lend
heavily to subprime mortgage borrowers with weak credit
ratings” to sustain the process.194
By 2007, mortgage defaults increased, for a variety of
reasons, and these MBSs (and CDOs) began to rapidly lose
187. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 313 (2011).
188. See id. at 314 (“Between 1996 and 2007 the stock of outstanding
securitized credit in the United States would expand almost five-fold . . . .”).
189. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 164 (describing a general
asset-backed security).
190. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 313 (explaining that mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs) were “often bolstered by credit enhancements, including
guarantees obligating the sponsoring bank to cover defaulting mortgages in the
pool”).
191. See ROBERT C. POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? 49 (2010) (noting that banks
hired credit-rating agencies to analyze and rate MBSs in order to be competitive
with other securities).
192. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 314 (discussing how credit ratings for
MBSs “were built on quantitative models assuming low default rates and rising
home values”).
193. Id. at 313.
194. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4.

HEDGE FUND ADVISER REGISTRATION

681

value.195 Consequently, credit-rating agencies downgraded many
of their ratings for MBSs because their underlying assumptions
proved misguided.196 Because many hedge funds and banks had
taken large positions in MBSs and CDOs, this created systemic
risk.197 At the same time, many investors had participated in
credit default swaps.198 A credit default swap—in which one party
agrees to pay the principal amount if a home mortgage defaults
in exchange for a stream of payments from the counterparty—is
supposed to serve a risk-hedging function for MBSs in case of
default (almost like insurance).199 Nevertheless, many hedge
funds (and other investors) used credit default swaps for
speculative purposes to profit from the defaulting MBSs and
declining housing market.200 When the housing market crashed,
however, many of these credit default swaps became worthless
because counterparties could not pay the large volume of credit
default swaps coming due at one time.201 Thus, without a hedge
for the toxic mortgage-backed investments that so many financial
institutions held, a domino effect of financial crisis spread across
the United States.202
Notably, the systemic risk implications of the housing
market, and the involvement of hedge funds in the crisis, came to
195. See id. (explaining that in 2006 and 2007 “mortgage defaults increased
significantly” and “[t]he resulting deterioration in mortgage performance
adversely affected mortgage-backed securities and their more complicated
variants”).
196. See POZEN, supra note 191, at 60 (explaining that as subprime
mortgages began to default, the credit-rating agencies downgraded the ratings
of many MBSs).
197. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166 (“The correlated positions
of banks and hedge funds in CDOs and MBSs created systemic risk.”).
198. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 314 (noting that “outstanding credit
default swaps—derivative contracts equally suitable for hedging risks on
mortgage-related securities and speculating against them—literally
skyrocketed” between 2001 and 2007).
199. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166 (describing a general
credit default swap and its typical uses).
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (explaining that credit
default swaps can be used for speculative as well as hedging purposes).
201. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166–67 (explaining that when
the housing market declined, “the web of credit default swaps started to
unravel” and many credit default swaps became essentially worthless).
202. See id. at 167 (discussing that when many banks and other institutions
could no longer hedge against the deteriorating MBSs, the crisis spread).
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the forefront in July 2007.203 At that point, two Bear Stearns
hedge funds “that had invested heavily in CDOs failed.”204 In
March 2008, Bear Stearns was bailed out when the government
orchestrated a buyout by J.P. Morgan.205 Bear Stearns’s failure,
sparked by the collapse of two of its hedge funds, was the
beginning of an economic contagion that infected the United
States.206
Soon more serious systemic risk consequences came to light
as a result of the massive amount of leverage in the financial
system, “particularly among investment banks and hedge
funds.”207 When financial institutions began suffering huge losses
because of deteriorating MBSs, many institutions had to sell
liquid assets to maintain required leverage ratios.208 Because
banks and other institutions needed cash on their balance sheets,
they began “calling outstanding loans of hedge funds and other
institutional investors.”209 Many of these hedge funds were highly
leveraged, so they also had to sell liquid assets to pay the
banks.210 Furthermore, “credit became scarce and interest rates
soared on short-term debt” because banks were hesitant to lend
in the midst of so much financial uncertainty.211
This created a ripple effect in which financial entities began
selling liquid assets for cash, especially publicly-traded stocks.212
203. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that in “July 2007, two Bear
Stearns hedge funds that had invested heavily in CDOs failed”); see also Beville
et. al., supra note 7, at 855–56 (noting that “systemic implications became
apparent as large subprime lenders warned of significant losses” and when
“Merrill Lynch seized $400 million in assets of a Bear Stearns fund that
incurred heavy losses in mortgage-backed investments”).
204. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4.
205. See id. (“An ad hoc government rescue was hurriedly put in place,
culminating in JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns.”).
206. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting that the collapse of the
Bear Stearns hedge funds signaled the beginning of the Financial Crisis).
207. POZEN, supra note 191, at 122.
208. See id. at 123 (explaining that losses in MBSs forced financial
institutions to sell assets to maintain required leverage ratios).
209. Id. at 122.
210. See id. (noting that because hedge funds were highly leveraged, they
also were forced to sell assets in order to pay the banks calling outstanding
loans).
211. Id. at 123.
212. See id. at 122 (“Since the markets for corporate bonds and asset-backed
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This process, known as “deleveraging,” creates a cycle in which
firms “sell assets, [and] prices decline in response to the increased
supply, creating further losses and potentially requiring
additional selling.”213 Ultimately, the crisis in the housing market
spread to the capital markets, and the U.S. stock market
plummeted by over 38% in 2008.214 With systemic risk
consequences in full effect, the Financial Crisis developed into
one of the worst recessions in the United States’ history.215
B. Dodd–Frank Title IV (PFIARA)
In response to the Financial Crisis, Congress passed the
Dodd–Frank Act to promote financial stability in the United
States.216 One of the primary ways the Dodd–Frank Act seeks to
provide this stability is by monitoring financial markets for
systemic risks.217 Importantly, Congress established the FSOC218
to identify systemic risks and “respond to emerging threats” to
the U.S. financial system.219 In light of these goals, and to fill
what many saw as a regulatory gap, Title IV of the Dodd–Frank
Act (PFIARA) was enacted to regulate hedge funds directly.220

securities were frozen, the sellers turned to their most liquid holdings—publicly
traded stocks.”).
213. Id. at 123.
214. Id.
215. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that the “economy sank into
the deepest recession in decades” because of the Financial Crisis).
216. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (stating the Dodd–
Frank Act was enacted to “promote the financial stability of the United States”).
217. See, e.g., id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–72 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-4) (establishing a system in which the SEC can require certain
private fund advisers to report information for the assessment of systemic risk
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)).
218. See id. § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392–93 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 5321) (establishing the FSOC).
219. Id. § 112(a), 124 Stat. at 1394–95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 5322).
220. See id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b3) (eliminating the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers Act that most
hedge funds relied on to avoid SEC registration).
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1. What Is the Point of the PFIARA?

The PFIARA has two goals: (i) to provide better protection to
private fund investors from private fund advisers; and (ii) to
assess systemic risk posed by private funds.221 The PFIARA
primarily aims to further the first goal by amending adviser
registration and reporting requirements under the Advisers
Act.222 The second goal is to be accomplished by requiring
registered advisers to file certain information with the SEC that
the FSOC can then use to assess systemic risk.223 The PFIARA
defines a private fund as an investment fund that falls under the
Investment Company Act (but for any exemptions under the
Investment Company Act).224 The SEC makes clear that this
definition includes hedge funds.225
2. Who Has to Register Under the Advisers Act Because of the
PFIARA?
The PFIARA requires all hedge fund advisers to register
under the Advisers Act unless exempted.226 Notably, the PFIARA
eliminates the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers Act
221. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-57, at 866 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf (stating Title IV of the Dodd–
Frank Act “expands the advisers’ reporting requirements to the SEC as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors or for the assessment of risk by the FSOC”).
222. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 403–404, 124 Stat. 1376,
1571–74 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(amending adviser registration and reporting requirements under the Advisers
Act).
223. See id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3) (requiring private fund advisers registered under the Advisers Act to
submit certain information to the SEC that the FSOC can use to assess systemic
risk).
224. See id. § 402(a)(29), 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2) (defining private fund under the PFIARA).
225. See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund
Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and
Foreign Private Advisers, Release No. IA 3222, at 3 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter
SEC Exemptions Release] (“Private funds include hedge funds . . . .”).
226. See Dodd–Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (providing the exemptions for hedge fund adviser
registration under the Advisers Act).
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that hedge fund advisers traditionally relied on to avoid SEC
registration.227 Instead, the PFIARA sets out a narrow list of
exemptions, so that more private fund advisers have to register
with the SEC.228 The first exemption for adviser registration
includes any private fund adviser who manages solely private
funds and has AUM less than $150 million.229 Thus, if a hedge
fund adviser manages more than $150 million in assets,
regardless of the number of clients in the fund(s), she must
register with the SEC under the Advisers Act. States will have
responsibility for hedge fund advisers with AUM between $25
million and $100 million.230 The determination of AUM is to be
made annually.231
The second exemption is for “family office” funds as defined
by the SEC.232 A family office fund cannot have clients other than
“family clients.” Family clients include current and former family
members, certain key employees of the family office, charities
funded exclusively by family clients, and other entities as deemed
appropriate by the SEC.233 These funds must be exclusively
controlled by one or more family members and wholly owned by
family clients.234 The SEC notes that the premise behind the
227. See id. (eliminating the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers
Act).
228. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 3 (“The primary
purpose of Congress repealing § 203(b)(3) [of the Advisers Act] was to require
advisers of ‘private funds’ to register under the Advisers Act.”).
229. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–
74 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (explaining an exemption
from registration for private fund advisers managing solely private funds and
with AUM less than $150 million).
230. See id. § 410, 124 Stat. at 1576–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3a) (providing the assets threshold for federal registration of investment
advisers).
231. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 90 (stating that an
adviser must “annually calculate the amount of private fund assets it
manages”).
232. See Dodd–Frank Act § 409, 124 Stat. at 1575–76 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2) (providing the adviser registration exemption for family
office funds).
233. See Family Offices, Release No. IA 3220, at 6 (June 22, 2011) (defining
the term family client under the family office fund adviser registration
exemption).
234. See id. at 30 (outlining the family ownership and control requirements
for a private fund to qualify for the family office exemption under the Advisers
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family office fund exemption is “to allow families to manage their
own wealth.”235 Interestingly, the SEC takes the approach that
key employees can participate in family funds, without
registering under the Advisers Act, because their position and
experience enable them to protect themselves as investors.236
Furthermore, exempting key employees allows family office funds
to attract talented investment professionals.237 The family office
fund exemption, therefore, allows families (and key employees) to
manage hedge funds, regardless of AUM, without having to
register with the SEC.
The third exemption is for qualifying venture capital funds’
advisers.238 The venture capital fund must fit into a narrow set of
criteria to avail its adviser(s) of this exemption.239 To be exempt
as a venture capital fund adviser, the private fund must generally
limit leverage, represent itself as pursuing a venture capital
strategy to its investors, and not offer redemption rights to
investors (among other criteria).240 Because of its narrow
language, virtually no hedge funds will qualify for the venture
capital fund exemption. The final exemption, for certain foreign
private advisers, is extremely narrow and beyond the scope of
this Note.241

Act).
235. Id. at 28.
236. See id. at 23–30 (discussing the SEC’s rationale for allowing key
employees to be included in family office funds).
237. See id. at 28 (explaining that permitting key employees in family office
funds “allows family offices to attract talented investment professionals”).
238. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 407, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–
75 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (outlining the adviser
exemption for certain venture capital fund advisers).
239. See id. (stating the venture capital fund adviser exemption criteria will
be promulgated by the SEC).
240. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 9–72 (providing a full
summary of the criteria required for the venture capital fund adviser
exemption).
241. See Dodd–Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (providing an adviser exemption for certain foreign private
advisers). To qualify for the foreign private-adviser exemption, a hedge fund
adviser must have AUM less than $25 million (among other criteria). Id.
Because this threshold is so narrow, this exemption is unlikely to have any
significant effect on systemic risk.
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3. PFIARA Goal 1: How Will Investor Protection Be Furthered?
As mentioned, the PFIARA’s first goal aims to provide
greater investor protection by amending adviser registration and
reporting requirements under the Advisers Act.242 Because hedge
fund advisers managing over $150 million now have to register
under the Advisers Act, they have to file Form ADV with the
SEC. Form ADV is the form used by investment advisers to
register with the SEC.243 The SEC states that the data collected
from Form ADV is used “to protect investors” and “to create risk
profiles of investment advisers.”244
Form ADV, divided into Part One and Part Two, is updated
by the registered investment adviser at the end of each year
(some information requires more frequent updating).245 Part One
requires information about the investment adviser’s business,
ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations,
and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its employees (in
addition to other information).246 Part Two requires registered
advisers to provide new and prospective clients with a brochure
and brochure supplements containing most of the information
required in Form ADV’s Part One.247 All of the information
disclosed under Form ADV is fully available to the public.248
Interestingly, the SEC now requires all exempt private funds
to file Part One of Form ADV as well.249 And, even though the
242. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text (discussing investor
protection as a goal of the PFIARA).
243. See Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/formadv.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Form ADV is the uniform form
used by investment advisers to register with both the SEC and state securities
authorities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
244. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Release No. IA 3221, at 54 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter SEC
Implementing Release].
245. See id. at 16 (describing when a registered adviser must update Form
ADV).
246. See Form ADV, supra note 243 (explaining the general requirements of
Form ADV’s Part One).
247. See id. (explaining the general requirements of Form ADV’s Part Two).
248. See SEC Implementing Release, supra note 244, at 49 (stating that all
information contained in Form ADV and filed with the SEC is to be made
available to the public).
249. See id. at 40 (explaining exempt reporting advisers still have to report
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adviser is exempt from registration, the disclosed information is
available to the public.250 The SEC explains that “Congress gave
[it] broad authority under §§ 203(l) and 203(m) of the Advisers
Act to require exempt reporting advisers to file reports as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”251 The SEC thinks public reporting
requirements will “provide a level of transparency that will help
[it] to identify practices that may harm investors, will aid
investors in conducting their own due diligence, and will deter
advisers’ fraud and facilitate earlier discovery of potential
misconduct.”252
The SEC plans to monitor the data collected from Form ADV
and then conduct “examinations” on advisers that raise red
flags.253 In an examination, the SEC checks the adviser’s books
and records for conflicts of interest and other misconduct.
Although exempt and registered advisers are subject to
examinations, former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated that
the SEC does “not intend to conduct routine examinations” of
exempt reporting advisers because “[a]s many observers know,
the [SEC] has scarce resources and it is important therefore that
[it] target those resources toward the advisers actually
registered.”254
4. PFIARA Goal 2: How Will the Systemic Risks of Private Funds
Be Assessed?
The second goal of the PFIARA, the assessment of systemic
risk posed by hedge funds, is to be accomplished through a

information on Part One of Form ADV).
250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the public
availability of information reported with Form ADV).
251. SEC Implementing Release, supra note 244, at 110.
252. Id. at 49–50.
253. See id. at 117 (noting that the information from Form ADV will allow
the SEC “to conduct targeted examinations of private fund advisers”).
254. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement
at SEC Open Meeting: Dodd–Frank Act Amendments to the Investment
Advisers Act (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2011/spch062211mls-items-1-2.htm.
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collection of data for the FSOC to assess.255 The SEC will collect
this data using the newly created Form PF.256 The SEC requires
all registered hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to file
Form PF.257 The SEC, however, has differentiated reporting
requirements based on whether the hedge fund adviser is a
“Small Private Fund Adviser” or a “Large Private Fund
Adviser.”258 A Small Private Fund Adviser of a hedge fund has
AUM between $150 million and $1.5 billion.259 A Large Private
Fund Adviser of a hedge fund has AUM over $1.5 billion.260 Form
PF is divided into four sections, but only Section 1 and Section 2
apply to hedge funds.261
All registered hedge fund advisers (Large and Small Private
Fund Advisers) must fill out Section 1 of Form PF.262 Section 1a
requires registered hedge fund advisers to provide basic
information about any hedge funds they manage.263 Section 2b
asks for more detailed information about each fund, such as each
fund’s gross and net assets, the aggregate value of its derivatives
positions, and its use of leverage.264 This section also asks for the
“percentage of the fund’s equity held by the five largest equity
holders.”265 The SEC says Section 1b “is designed to allow the
255. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
the PFIARA).
256. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisers on Form PF,
Release No. IA 3308, at 7 (October 31, 2011) [hereinafter Form PF Release]
(stating that registered advisers must submit Form PF to the SEC to satisfy
systemic risk reporting requirements under the PFIARA).
257. See id. at 18 (describing which investment advisers must file Form PF).
258. See id. at 20–21 (differentiating adviser reporting requirements for
Form PF based on the size of the hedge fund).
259. See id. at 21 (explaining the Small Private Fund Adviser threshold
under Form PF).
260. See id. (explaining the Large Private Fund Adviser threshold under
Form PF).
261. See id. at 20–21 (noting which sections of Form PF are applicable to
hedge funds).
262. See id. at 63 (stating that all registered hedge funds are required to fill
out Section 1 of Form PF).
263. See id. at 63–65 (outlining information required by Section 1a of Form
PF).
264. See id. (outlining information required by Section 1b of Form PF).
265. Id. at 65–66.

690

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651 (2013)

FSOC to monitor certain systemic risks for the broader private
fund industry.”266 The final part of Section 1, Section 1c, gathers
data on each separate hedge fund managed by the adviser, such
as “each fund’s investment strategies and the percentage of the
fund’s
assets
managed
using
high-frequency
trading
267
In addition, advisers have to identify each hedge
strategies.”
fund’s top trading counterparties and information on trading and
clearing practices.268 The SEC states Section 1c is “designed to
enable FSOC to monitor systemic risk that could be transmitted
through counterparty exposure, track how different trading
strategies are affected by and correlated with market stresses,
and follow the extent of private fund activities conducted away
from regulated exchanges and clearing systems.”269
Section 2 of Form PF requires information solely from
Large Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds (AUM greater than
$1.5 billion).270 The SEC tailored Section 2 to acquire additional
data focused on “relevant areas of financial activity that have the
potential to raise systemic concerns.”271 Section 2a requires Large
Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds to give very detailed
reports on the value of “assets invested (on a short and long
basis) in different types of securities and commodities (e.g.,
different types of equities, fixed income securities, derivatives,
and structured products).”272 The SEC believes this will help the
FSOC monitor different asset classes typically held by hedge
funds and show trends in hedge funds’ exposures.273 Section 2b
requires further disclosure on each separate hedge fund managed
with a net asset value over $500 million at the end of any month
in the prior fiscal quarter.274 Advisers must disclose information
such as portfolio liquidity, large institutional positions, posting of

266. Id. at 73.
267. Id. at 74–75.
268. See id. (describing information required by Section 1c of Form PF).
269. Id. at 76.
270. See id. at 21 (explaining large hedge fund advisers must complete
Section 2 of Form PF).
271. Id. at 77.
272. Id. at 78.
273. See id. at 82 (explaining the rationale behind Section 2a of Form PF).
274. See id. at 83 (describing the requirements of Section 2b of Form PF).
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collateral by counterparties, leverage, and internal risk
assessments.275
Large Private Fund Advisers have a quarterly reporting
requirement, and Small Private Fund Advisers only have to make
annual reports.276 The SEC designed the Large Private Fund
Adviser threshold for hedge funds to gather more systemic risk
information on a substantial portion of assets in the hedge fund
industry.277 The SEC estimates that the $1.5 billion threshold
will capture “over 80% of the U.S. hedge fund industry.”278
Comparatively, Small Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds have
to report less information, less frequently, than Large Private
Fund Advisers. This is because, from a systemic risk monitoring
perspective, the SEC does not think additional information or
more frequent reporting is justified for hedge funds smaller than
$1.5 billion.279
All of the information gathered in Form PF is to remain
confidential because of its proprietary and sensitive nature.280
The information, however, may be shared with other federal
departments, agencies, or self-regulatory organizations within
the scope of their jurisdiction, subject to confidentiality
agreements.281 The SEC said it will also coordinate with foreign
financial regulators using the Form PF data.282 The SEC
promises to adopt controls and systems to protect the
confidentiality of the collected information.283
275. See id. at 83–97 (providing a full summary of Section 2b reporting
requirements under Form PF).
276. See id. at 50 (stating the frequency of reporting for Form PF based on
hedge fund size).
277. See id. at 31 (explaining the rationale behind the Large Private Fund
Adviser threshold for hedge funds on Form PF).
278. Id. at 31. This is 2011 data that comes from a hedge fund industry
survey that the SEC has access to called HedgeFund Intelligence. Id.
279. See id. at 54 (explaining the rationale behind the smaller hedge fund
adviser reporting requirement on Form PF).
280. See id. at 112 (explaining the rationale behind keeping information
gathered from Form PF confidential).
281. See id. (discussing entities that the Dodd–Frank Act allows Form PF
data to be shared with).
282. See id. at 11 (noting that the Dodd–Frank Act “states that FSOC shall
coordinate with foreign financial regulators in assessing systemic risk”).
283. See id. at 115 (explaining potential controls and systems that the SEC
may use to protect the confidentiality of Form PF data).
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Ultimately, the SEC gives the acquired data to the FSOC.284
The FSOC uses the data to monitor hedge fund activities and
trends in the hedge fund industry that relate to systemic risk.285
The FSOC interprets the data and decides whether hedge funds’
activities or trends “could create or increase the risk of significant
liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading” across U.S.
financial markets.286 Then, the FSOC can make recommendations
to applicable regulatory agencies to “apply new or heightened
standards and safeguards for a financial activity or practice” that
is causing systemic risk.287 Also, if the FSOC finds that a
particular hedge fund—based on “the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities” of the
hedge fund—poses a systemic threat to the financial stability of
the United States, it can require the Federal Reserve Board to
supervise the hedge fund.288
V. Analysis and Recommendations
Part V of this Note provides a final analysis of hedge fund
regulation after the enactment of the PFIARA. Part V.A analyzes
whether hedge fund adviser registration under the Advisers Act
is necessary in light of the PFIARA’s goals. Part V.B provides
recommendations for hedge fund regulation going forward.

284. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–
74 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4) (stating that the SEC must
collect information related to the assessment of systemic risk from certain
private investment funds and provide that information to the FSOC).
285. See id. § 112(a), 124 Stat. at 1394–96 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5322) (detailing the purposes and duties of the FSOC).
286. Id. § 120(a), 124 Stat. at 1408–09 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5330).
287. Id.
288. Id. § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1398 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5323).
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A. Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary in Light of the
PFIARA?
This section analyzes whether hedge fund adviser
registration under the Advisers Act is necessary in light of the
PFIARA’s two goals: hedge fund investor protection and hedge
fund systemic risk assessment.289 This Note argues that hedge
fund adviser registration is unnecessary because the PFIARA’s
goals can be met without it. Thus, resources are being wasted
from the perspective of the hedge fund industry and the SEC.
1. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Is Unnecessary for Investor
Protection
At first blush, the PFIARA’s hedge fund adviser registration
requirements do not seem particularly onerous. Much of the
proprietary information that hedge fund advisers have to disclose
will not be reported on Form ADV.290 Instead, items like trading
strategies and asset positions will be reported on Form PF and
kept confidential.291 Passed after a moment of crisis, the PFIARA
integrated hedge fund adviser registration into the Dodd–Frank
Act—an Act largely concerned with controlling systemic risks to
avoid a national financial meltdown.292 Thus, the issue becomes
whether adviser registration, from an investor protection
standpoint, squares with the core goals of the Dodd–Frank Act
and whether adviser registration is even necessary in the hedge
fund industry.
The Advisers Act “is mainly a registration and anti-fraud
statute.”293 There is nothing to suggest, however, that hedge
funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis stemmed from
fraudster hedge fund advisers. Although the SEC states hedge
289. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (stating the two goals of the
PFIARA).
290. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing reporting information required by
Form ADV).
291. See supra Part IV.B.4 (same).
292. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
the Dodd–Frank Act and the circumstances surrounding its enactment).
293. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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fund investor protection is a goal of the PFIARA, it does not offer
any evidence that hedge fund adviser fraud played a key role in the
Financial Crisis.294 As discussed, many academics are reluctant to
state (with certainty) the exact part hedge funds had in the
Financial Crisis.295 But many academics agree that hedge funds
contributed to the systemic risk consequences that resulted in (and
from) the Financial Crisis.296 For example, many suggest that some
hedge funds speculated against deteriorating MBSs by using credit
default swaps, other hedge funds invested heavily in toxic CDOs
(Bear Stearns), and many hedge funds played a large role in the
deleveraging process of the financial system that further intensified
the crisis.297 Nonetheless, it has not been proposed that hedge fund
adviser fraud played a key role in the Financial Crisis.
Recall, in 2007, the SEC passed the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud
Rule, which provides a route for the SEC to bring actions against
fraudster hedge fund advisers using a negligence standard.298
The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, therefore, has a lower
standard for liability than Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act.299
Furthermore, after the crash of LTCM, hedge funds vowed to
provide their investors with more transparency.300 Since then,
investors and counterparties to hedge funds “demand, and usually
receive, disclosure to the extent it helps them assess the merits of
their investments.”301 In addition, the SEC now requires
294. The SEC does not offer any evidence that hedge fund adviser fraud
related to the Financial Crisis in its Implementing Release, the SEC
Exemptions Release, or the SEC Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser
Examinations following the Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act.
295. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (acknowledging that hedge
funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis is not fully understood).
296. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the roles, of which many academics
agree, hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis).
297. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the roles, of which many academics
agree, hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis).
298. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s
promulgation of the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule).
299. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 10b-5’s
liability standard).
300. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining how the hedge
fund industry vowed greater transparency to investors after the crash of
LTCM).
301. Schwartz, supra note 122, at 218.
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exempt hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to file certain
information about each fund they manage on Form ADV.302 This
information is publicly available, and the SEC suggests that it will
provide investors with more transparency and deter adviser fraud.303
The hedge fund industry also, from an investor protection
standpoint, has many safeguards. Hedge funds require high initial
investments that restrict the industry to sophisticated investors.304
Hedge funds also limit interests in their funds to accredited
investors305 to avoid reporting requirements under the Securities
Act.306 The Dodd–Frank Act actually heightened standards for what
qualifies as an accredited investor under the Securities Act in private
offerings.307 This will further ensure that hedge funds offer their
interests to more sophisticated parties. In sum, hedge fund adviser
registration is unnecessary because (i) there is already an adequate
anti-fraud rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased transparency
to their investors; and (iii) hedge funds have a sophisticated investor
class that does not need the same protections provided to ordinary
investors.
In addition, there are a few other thoughts worth noting.
First, there are financial and resource concerns from the
perspective of smaller hedge fund advisers, and, more
importantly, the SEC. Not all funds can afford to hire new
compliance officers to gather the information required by adviser
registration under the Advisers Act.308 Although $150 million in
302. See supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text (discussing how the
SEC requires exempt private hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to
report information on Form ADV’s Part One).
303. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning
behind why the SEC is requiring exempt private hedge fund advisers under the
Advisers Act to report certain information that will be publicly available).
304. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing how hedge funds
require significant minimum investments).
305. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the term
accredited investor under the Securities Act).
306. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the term
accredited investor under the Securities Act).
307. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577
(2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b note) (adjusting the accredited
investor standard under the Securities Act so that the net worth of an
accredited investor must be over $1 million excluding the value of the investor’s
primary residence).
308. See Azam Ahmed, For Small Hedge Funds, Success Brings New
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AUM seems large on the surface, some smaller hedge fund
advisers note that this is just a blip in an almost $1.6 trillion
industry.309 This threshold appears over-inclusive in a sector that
the SEC estimates is dominated by funds managing over $1.5
billion in assets (over 80% of all hedge fund AUM).310 Also, the
SEC admits that it has limited resources to carry out hedge fund
adviser examinations in light of the PFIARA. In a study required
by the Dodd–Frank Act, Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser
Examinations, the SEC stated “[it] will not likely have sufficient
capacity in the near or long term to conduct effective
examinations of registered investment advisers with adequate
frequency” after the PFIARA’s enactment.311 The increased strain
on smaller funds and the SEC are additional reasons why hedge
fund adviser registration under the Advisers Act is unnecessary.
Also lurking in the background of whether or not hedge fund
adviser registration is necessary under the Dodd–Frank Act, is
another question: Even if hedge fund adviser fraud was a
legitimate reason for passing the PFIARA, is hedge fund adviser
registration the best option to combat this supposed problem?
Although this raises a host of issues that are likely the topic of
another discussion, history suggests adviser registration has its
weaknesses. The recent uncovering of the shocking, and
financially devastating, Ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff312—who
had voluntarily registered his hedge funds with the SEC and
Headaches,
N.Y TIMES DEALBOOK
(Jan.
20,
2011,
8:00
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/for-small-hedge-funds-success-bringsnew-headaches/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (detailing the financial burdens many
smaller hedge funds will face as a result of the Dodd–Frank Act) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. See id. (explaining that one hedge fund adviser thinks $150 million
funds are the “guppies” of the industry and do not pose great risks to the U.S.
financial system).
310. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (detailing hedge fund data
used by the SEC).
311. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER
EXAMINATIONS 3–4 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.
pdf.
312. The author thanks George Mason University School of Law Professor
J.W. Verret for pointing out this interesting dynamic as it related to this Note.
Also, the author thanks Professor Verret for noting potential reasons for the
hedge fund industry’s apathy towards the Dodd–Frank Act’s adviser
registration amendments. See infra notes 314–16 and accompanying text.
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whose fraudulent activity went undetected for years313—suggests
that adviser registration may not be the government’s solution to
the kind of fraudulent activity that it fears, regardless of whether
or not this registration is necessary under the Dodd–Frank Act.
Lastly, although some suggest that many hedge funds
remain unconcerned about adviser registration,314 this may be
more telling of another story. In an industry dominated by larger
funds,315 perhaps existing funds do not mind adviser registration
because smaller funds are more likely to bear the brunt of the
costs.316 Further, SEC registration expenditures will certainly
raise entry costs for start-up hedge funds, which may deter future
competition. The hedge fund industry’s apathy towards this new
legislation, therefore, could be the combination of a couple things:
(i) large, existing hedge funds may view adviser registration as a
vehicle that will help them maintain their top status by stifling
smaller competition; and (ii) the hedge fund industry may not
think that adviser registration presents much of an obstacle at
all, which calls into question whether such registration serves as
a deterrent for issues like adviser fraud.
2. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Is Unnecessary for Systemic
Risk Assessment
The collection of systemic risk information related to hedge
funds is a logical solution for hedge fund regulation. Hedge funds
have evolved into a large part of the U.S. financial markets.
313. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 20–21 (2009), http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (“[T]he SEC received more than ample
information . . . over the years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive
examination and/or investigation of Bernard Madoff . . . for operating a Ponzi
scheme, and . . . despite three examinations and two investigations being
conducted, a thorough and competent investigation or examination was never
performed.”).
314. See generally Bloomberg BNA, Hedge Funds Not Concerned About SEC
Registration, Study Finds, SEC. L. DAILY (Apr. 16, 2012) http://news.
bna.com/sdln/SDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=25818205&vname=sldbulalliss
ues&jd=a0d1k6f9q5&split=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Review).
315. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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Current hedge fund data is scattered throughout a variety of
industry surveys and a lot of information about hedge funds
remains opaque.317 The confidentiality of Form PF protects the
secretive nature of the hedge fund industry and preserves the
dynamic trading strategies that make hedge funds a viable
alternative investment.318 Also, the FSOC’s wait-and-see
approach (monitoring the information, studying it, and making
recommendations) allows it to obtain a full grasp on the evolving
issues of the hedge fund industry (such as systemic risk concerns)
before acting rashly.319
Nevertheless, hedge fund adviser registration under the
Advisers Act is unnecessary to gather information related to
systemic risk. If the government wants to collect systemic-riskrelated data from hedge funds, then why not simply collect the
information? Congress and the SEC could require hedge funds
(deemed to impact systemic risk) to report the exact information
in Form PF to the FSOC without hedge fund adviser regulation.
This would save the SEC’s (admittedly) limited resources and
would reduce adviser registration compliance costs for smaller
hedge funds—most importantly, it would accomplish the
PFIARA’s goal of assessing the systemic risks that stem from
hedge funds. This practical alternative would reduce costs and
provide a smooth transition because the FSOC regime is already
in place.
B. Recommendations
This Note asserts that hedge fund adviser registration
requirements should be eliminated under the PFIARA. As
explained, hedge fund adviser registration is unnecessary from
the investor protection standpoint and the systemic risk
assessment standpoint alike. But continuing to gather systemicrisk data from hedge funds through Form PF is a logical solution
317. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the hedge fund
industry as opaque).
318. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (stating the confidentiality
of Form PF).
319. See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text (explaining how the
FSOC will utilize Form PF data).
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because it fills an information gap for an opaque, but important,
industry. The information required by Form PF provides the
FSOC with detailed information that will help with the
monitoring of systemic risk.
Currently, the SEC thinks hedge funds with AUM exceeding
$1.5 billion should provide the most information connected with
systemic risk because these funds make up an estimated 80% of
the hedge fund industry.320 Arguments favoring this threshold
make sense because it includes a majority of the hedge fund
industry. Also, this amount is similar to the thresholds proposed
in the 1999 Disclosure Bill (over $3 billion AUM) and the 1999
Reform Bill (over $1 billion AUM), which both dealt with
controlling hedge-fund-related systemic risks after LTCM’s
collapse.321 Determining a threshold for what aggregate group of
hedge funds would provide the most pertinent information
related to systemic risk, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Nonetheless, once the threshold is determined, this Note
asserts that only data from the group of hedge funds deemed
most important to systemic risk assessment should be collected.
So, if the government determines hedge funds with more than
$1.5 billion AUM are most pertinent to systemic risk assessment,
requiring hedge funds with less than $1.5 billion AUM to report
data would be over-inclusive and a waste of resources. At the
same time, any exemptions (relating to systemic risk data
collection) for hedge funds exceeding the determined threshold
would render the policy under-inclusive. This Note, therefore,
suggests that once the line is drawn, no hedge funds with AUM
exceeding the determined threshold should be exempt from
providing information on Form PF. This is because “size matters”
when determining systemic risk concerns.322
For example, family office hedge funds with AUM that would
exceed the determined threshold should not be exempt from
320. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (detailing hedge fund data
used by the SEC).
321. See supra notes 131–47 and accompanying text (describing the hedge
fund reporting thresholds for the two proposed 1999 bills following the crash of
LTCM).
322. See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 203 (explaining that size matters
when considering the potential for systemic risk in a hedge fund).
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reporting information related to systemic risk. The theory behind
exempting family office hedge funds is that these extremely
private funds and families (along with key investment employees
of the family office fund) should be able to manage their wealth
without interference.323 But what makes a tight-knit family fund
managing billions of dollars less likely to affect systemic risk
than a similarly situated hedge fund whose investors are not
blood relatives? Famous hedge fund manager George Soros
recently kicked outside investors of his Soros Fund Management
hedge fund to the curb.324 Soros does not want to disclose any
information in light of the PFIARA’s enactment, so he decided the
family office fund exemption was in his best interest.325 The Soros
Fund Management hedge fund has AUM of approximately $25
billion.326 What is to say this fund’s failure or risky investment
decisions could not affect systemic risk? After all, George Soros is
the same hedge fund adviser who almost single-handedly crushed
the British pound sterling in currency markets by betting on its
devaluation in 1992 (and subsequently made around $1 billion off
the bet).327 Thus, to thoroughly evaluate systemic risks posed by
hedge funds, all hedge funds that are deemed important to
systemic risk assessment (whether alone or in the aggregate)
should provide information to the FSOC without exception.
There are problems, however, with this approach. First,
compliance costs will still be high for hedge funds. But, given the
serious consequences of the Financial Crisis, it is hard to make
an argument that more information is not needed on systemic
323. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale
behind the family office fund adviser registration exemption).
324. See Ben Rooney, Soros Hedge Fund is Now a $25 Billion Family Matter,
CNN MONEY (July 26, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/26/news/
companies/soros_fund/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (stating that George
Soros’s hedge fund, Soros Fund Management, “has officially closed the doors to
outside investors”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
325. See id. (“The fund’s Quantum Group will complete its transition to a
‘family office’ ahead of regulatory changes . . . .”).
326. Id.
327. See Ronald F. Lipp, The Crisis in International Trade: Remarks at the
20th Annual McGeorge International Law Symposium, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 31,
35 (2002) (noting that in 1992 George Soros almost single-handedly broke the
British pound currency markets by betting on the devaluation of the British
pound sterling).
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risk—especially information on a largely opaque hedge fund
industry. Second, it is questionable whether the SEC and the
FSOC have the resources and expertise to adequately assess the
systemic risk information given by hedge funds. This is a
legitimate concern, but the only practical alternative is to
establish a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO). Common
“[s]ecurities SROs include national securities exchanges and
securities associations registered with the SEC, such as the New
York Stock Exchange.”328 Practitioners and academics proposed
this idea prior to the Financial Crisis and the Dodd–Frank Act.329
The premise is that the hedge fund industry could regulate itself
through a private SRO that would coordinate with government
regulatory agencies.330 The SRO would be able to respond more
quickly to evolving hedge fund trends and would have more
expertise in dealing with hedge funds.331 There is a strong
argument for self-regulation through an SRO, but Congress has
largely ignored it.
The Dodd–Frank Act required the GAO to conduct a
feasibility study for a hedge fund adviser SRO, but, for a variety
of reasons, the report was largely dismissive of the idea.332 The
report stated that while an SRO for hedge fund advisers is
feasible, it would require legislative action and present
challenges.333 Among other concerns, the report suggested that a
hedge fund adviser SRO would present conflict-of-interest issues
and funding the SRO would be expensive.334 The GAO report
328. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS: ALTHOUGH
SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD
PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFS 9 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 GAO REPORT],
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11623.pdf.
329. See generally Verret, supra note 2 (providing a self-regulation proposal
for hedge funds in 2007 prior to the Dodd–Frank Act).
330. See 2011 GAO REPORT, supra note 328, at 9 (providing the potential
benefits of an SRO).
331. Id.
332. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1579
(2010) (stating that the GAO must conduct a study on a self-regulatory
organization for private funds).
333. See GAO REPORT, supra note 328, at 11 (explaining that “the general
consensus was that forming a private fund adviser SRO . . . could be done but
not without challenges”).
334. See id. at 20 (noting potential problems with a hedge fund adviser
SRO).
A
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suggested that the SRO might actually “increase the overall cost
of regulation by adding another layer of oversight.”335 The report
was also concerned that transparency would be limited because
the “SRO would be accountable primarily to its members rather
than to Congress or the public.”336 Although there is a strong
argument for a private SRO, the practical implications of the
GAO report suggest that it is an unlikely option.
Finally, there are confidentiality concerns in providing
information related to systemic risk to the SEC and the FSOC
with Form PF. The hedge fund industry has a competitive
advantage in creating unique investment strategies.337 These
unique strategies prevail because competitors have not been able
to use reverse engineering techniques to copy others’ strategies.338
This is possible because hedge funds have been able to keep
proprietary information confidential. Some will argue that
allowing the government to share the collected information with
other agencies and foreign governments (subject to confidentiality
agreements) poses a huge threat to hedge funds. The SEC has
stated, however, that it will not require systemic information
reporting through Form PF until it has controls and systems in
place.339 Thus, the only way to advance this counterargument is
to suggest a hypothetical circumstance in which the government
does not follow through on its confidentiality promise. Because
that argument is largely speculative, it does not hold much
weight.
VI. Conclusion
For years, proponents of hedge fund regulation called for
Congress to fill what they perceived as a regulatory gap.
Although hedge funds avoided most regulation for decades, the
Financial Crisis tipped the scales toward direct federal
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (discussing competitive
advantages of hedge funds).
338. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (same).
339. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (explaining that the SEC
plans to maintain confidentiality of Form PF data).
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regulation. The enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act, and more
specifically the PFIARA, forces many hedge funds to register with
the SEC under the amended Advisers Act. This Note asserts, for
several reasons, that hedge fund adviser registration under the
Advisers Act is unnecessary to advance the PFIARA’s goals:
hedge fund investor protection and hedge fund systemic risk
assessment. Consequently, hedge fund adviser registration is a
waste of the hedge fund industry and the SEC’s resources.
This Note, however, suggests that the collection of hedge
fund data, related to systemic risk, is necessary in light of the
Financial Crisis, but adviser registration is unnecessary to
achieve this goal. This Note provides more practical and tailored
alternatives to accomplish this task. Mainly, this Note asserts
that once a threshold (based on hedge fund size) is determined for
an aggregate group of hedge funds most pertinent to systemic
risk assessment, the FSOC should collect data directly through
Form PF. Collecting data from smaller hedge funds that do not
meet the determined threshold is unnecessary because this will
produce an over-inclusive regime. On the other hand, this Note
also argues that once a proper threshold is established, no hedge
funds with AUM exceeding the determined threshold should be
exempt from providing information related to systemic risk. This
will avoid an under-inclusive element to the regime as well and
accomplish the PFIARA’s most important goal—hedge fund
systemic risk assessment.

